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Article
The Community Reinvestment Act:






In recent articles, Professors Jonathan R. Macey of Cornell Law
School and Geoffrey P. Miller of the University of Chicago Law
School' have exchanged views with Professor Peter P. Swire of the
University of Virginia Law School2 regarding the Community Rein-
vestment Act (CRA).3 Under the CRA, banks, thrifts, and their
holding companies 4 are required "to help meet the credit needs of the
local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe
and sound operation of such institutions."5 Each year, federal bank-
* Associate Professor of Management, Graduate School of Business, Texas A&M
University.
** Cullen Foundation Chair of Business Administration and Professor of Finance,
Graduate School of Business, Texas A&M University.
*** T.J. Barlow Professor of Business Administration and Professor of Management,
Graduate School of Business, Texas A&M University.
1. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An
Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REv. 291 (1993).
2. Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the Community Reinvest-
ment Act, 79 VA. L. REv. 349 (1993).
3. Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1111 (1977) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2901-2907 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
4. Certain types of depository institutions such as credit unions are not covered by
the statute. See 12 U.S.C. § 2902(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Macey & Miller, supra note 1,
at 292 n.2, 312.
5. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See generally KENNETH SPONG,
BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECS 172-74 (3d ed.
1990).
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ing regulators examine and evaluate depository institutions with re-
spect to their compliance with the CRA.
6
In their article, Professors Macey and Miller present a strong cri-
tique of the CRA. The article essentially argues that the statute's re-
quirement that depository institutions meet local credit needs while
maintaining "safe and sound" operations is in many respects ox-
ymoronic. The authors argue the CRA fosters "inefficient credit allo-
cation," 7 frequently forcing banks to make bad loans. The CRA in
effect penalizes those banks that have conservative lending policies
and those that hold assets in the form of marketable securities.8 They
also assert the statute forces a nongeographically diversified allocation
of assets,9 and constitutes a considerable regulatory paperwork and
public relations burden for depository institutions. 10
In response to Professors Macey and Miller, Professor Swire of-
fers the novel proposal of a CRA "safe harbor."11 According to Pro-
fessor Swire, the standards used by federal banking CRA regulators
are extremely vague and subjective, thereby placing a tremendous
compliance burden on depository institutions. 12 He thus argues a
bank should be guaranteed favorable treatment with respect to the
CRA if it achieves certain CRA performance levels.13 Under the safe
harbor proposed, many of the CRA's present problems arguably
would be ameliorated. 14 Professors Macey and Miller counter, how-
ever, that while Professor Swire's proposal "would mitigate some of
the uncertainties that attend the CRA as presently administered," his
approach would "not address the fundamental problems with the stat-
6. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The term "federal banking regulators"
includes the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, and the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (a unit of the Treasury Department) has primary supervisory responsibility for
federally chartered banks. The Federal Reserve has the primary supervisory responsibility
for state-chartered banks that are members of the federal reserve system. The FDIC has
primary supervisory responsibility for state-chartered banks that are not members of the
Federal Reserve System. See SPONG, supra note 5.
7. Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 293 n.12, 309.
8. Id. at 318, 321-22.
9. Id. at 295, 304-10, 324.
10. Id. at 324-26, 330-33.
11. Swire, supra note 2, at 349.
12. Id. at 355-56, 361.
13. Id. at 349-50.
14. Id. at 351-53, 378-81.
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ute."'15 Indeed, in a July 19, 1993 "op-ed" article, Professor Macey
argued that the CRA should be scrapped. 16
Professors Macey, Miller, and Swire all strongly agree, however,
on the need for empirical analysis with respect to this subject. 17 We
have embarked on a preliminary analysis of this kind. Fortunately,
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
198918 mandates public disclosure of all regulatory agency CRA eval-
uations and ratings issued on or after July 1, 1990. We collected the
CRA ratings for all banks19 that were rated from July 1, 1990 through
the first quarter of 1992.20 The range of possible ratings includes (1)
"outstanding," (2) "satisfactory," (3) "needs to improve," and (4)
"substantial noncompliance."' We then collected a wide range of fi-
nancial and other data with regard to these institutions, including asset
size, membership in a holding company, profitability, makeup of loan
portfolio, assets held in marketable securities, and "publicly traded"
versus "nonpublicly traded" status.22 Finally, we correlated this infor-
mation with the given CRA ratings.
The results support the general assertions regarding the statute
made by Professors Macey, Miller, and Swire. The results show that,
as Professors Macey and Miller assert,23 banks interested in expansion
15. Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 293 n.12.
16. Jonathan R. Macey, Porkbarrel Banking, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1993, at A10.
17. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 294; Swire, supra note 2, at 351-52 n.8, 377
n.98.
18. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, § 807, 103 Stat. 183, 527-28 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2906 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992)).
19. Although the CRA covers other types of depository institutions, our empirical
study deals only with banks.
20. A total of 4,365 ratings were collected from the FDIC, the Federal Reserve Board,
and the Comptroller of Currency starting with July 1, 1990, up through released agency
ratings for February-March 1992. The sources in which agency ratings were found include
Federal Reserve Press Release, Dec. 10, 1991 (on file with Graduate School of Business,
Texas A&M University) (containing Federal Reserve Board CRA ratings from July 1, 1990
to Nov. 15, 1991).
21. See 12 U.S.C. § 2906; Uniform Interagency Community Reinvestment Act Guide-
lines for Disclosure of Written Evaluations and Revisions to Assessment Rating System, 54
Fed. Reg. 52914, 52916 (1989).
22. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT OF
CONDITIONS AND INCOME FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS AND SELECTED OTHER FINANCIAL
INsTrrtrrONS (1990) (containing bank financial data). We used logistic regression method-
ology in explaining the variations in the CRA rankings across the banks in our sample. See
infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. See generally JOHN NE=ER ET AL., Applied Lin-
ear Regression Models (1983).
23. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 300.
do indeed have higher CRA ratings.24 But there are also interesting
anomalies in the CRA ratings data. For example, Professors Macey
and Miller emphasize the case of Cambridge State Bank of Cam-
bridge, Minnesota, which received a "substantial noncompliance"
CRA rating because it had too many assets in bonds and marketable
securities and had been too conservative in its asset allocation prac-
tices.25 Our data, however, somewhat surprisingly show that deposi-
tory institutions with large proportions of assets in marketable-
investment securities overall have above-average CRA ratings. 26
This and other counterintuitive empirical results27 seem to
strongly support Professor Swire's underlying assertion, 28 which was
also forcefully made by Professors Macey and Miller,29 that the CRA
rating standards are so vague that the rating agencies can basically
assign any CRA ratings they want. Indeed, regulators may be using
the CRA ratings as something of a "stick" with which to take action
against institutions they hold in disfavor for other reasons.30 Thus,
there may be something more to Cambridge State Bank's CRA rating
than otherwise meets the eye. Overall, the data strongly support Pro-
fessor Swire's call for more specific standards in this area, whether by
way of safe harbors or another approach.
What follows is a review of our preliminary empirical results in
the context of both the Miller and Macey and Swire articles, as well as
President Clinton's July 15, 1993 call for CRA reform3' and the Clin-
24. Tables One, Two, Three, and Four, which appear infra in the Appendix, show that
banks that are part of holding companies and have large numbers of affiliates-both good
proxies for expansion activity-have higher CRA ratings.
25. Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 318.
26. Tables Three and Four show that with all other factors held constant under logistic
regressions, banks with high CRA ratings have significantly more of their assets in govern-
ment securities than banks with low CRA ratings.
27. For example, Table One shows that banks with low CRA ratings make more con-
sumer and multifamily residential loans.
28. See Swire, supra note 2, at 369-71.
29. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 326-30.
30. Regulatory agencies and their employees are often interested in maximizing their
own sphere of influence and objectives. See Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The
Government Contractor Defense: Contractual Allocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REV.
257, 320-25 (1991).
31. See Memorandum from President William J. Clinton to Hon. Eugene A. Ludwig,
Comptroller of the Currency; Hon. Andrew C. Hove, Acting Chairperson, FDIC; Hon.
Alan Greenspan, Chair, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System; and Hon. Jonathan
Fiechter, Acting Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, The White House, July 15, 1993
[hereinafter Clinton Memorandum] (on file with Graduate School of Business, Texas
A&M University). For general background on the Clinton Administration proposals, see
Kenneth H. Bacon, Clinton Wins Support for More Loans to Poor Areas, but Plan Faces
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ton Administration's December 21, 1993 proposed CRA regula-
tions.32 Part I first advances general hypotheses derived principally
from these articles regarding possible relationships between the CRA
and depository institution makeup. Part I then presents an overview
of study methodology. Next, Part II examines and analyzes these hy-
potheses in light of our preliminary empirical data. Finally, Part III
presents an overall policy review, including an analysis of the new pro-
posed regulations, in view of our empirical data. It is hoped that these
findings will be helpful in enlightening the debate regarding the CRA
begun by Professors Macey, Miller, and Swire, and continuing among
policy makers in Washington.
I. The CRA and Depository Institution Makeup
A. Overview
In their article, Professors Macey and Miller set forth a number
of general hypotheses regarding possible relationships between CRA
ratings and depository institution makeup. Since the Act requires reg-
ulators to take CRA performance into account whenever a depository
institution makes an application to acquire another depository facil-
ity,33 Professors Macey and Miller posit that large banks interested in
establishing new branches or acquiring other banks will likely have
relatively high CRA ratings.3 4 Similarly, they posit that "wholesale"
(as opposed to "retail") banks primarily engaged in corporate bank-
ing, depository institutions that emphasize trust services, and deposi-
tory institutions with conservative investment strategies holding large
percentages of loans in marketable securities will have relatively low
CRA ratings.35 They also speculate that institutions with a lot of
"risky" CRA loans may be "sacrificing profit," which implies institu-
tions with high CRA ratings may have lower net interest income and
profits.3 6
While Professor Swire does not explore these potential interrela-
tionships as extensively as Professors Macey and Miller, he does assert
Obstacles, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1993, at A5; Kenneth H. Bacon, Clinton to Seek Rules to
Cut Paperwork For Banks, to Boost Loans in Poor Areas, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1993, at B2;
Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Clinton Meets with Bentsen in Search for Treasury Chief, Economic
Staff, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1992, at A14; see also Swire, supra note 2, at 356-58.
32. 58 Fed. Reg. 67,466 (1993).
33. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). This includes branch expansion and
merger activities. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(3).
34. Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 315.
35. Id. at 316-18.
36. Id. at 319-22.
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that small banks are less likely to have high CRA ratings than large
banks.37 He notes that small banks "lack specialized personnel and
other economies of scale" of a kind that would enable them to obtain
high CRA ratings.38 He further suggests a high CRA rating may gen-
erally be less important to smaller depository institutions because they
are less likely to be the target of CRA protests39 than large banks and
are less likely to apply for branch openings or mergers than their
larger counterparts. 40 In developing his safe harbor proposal, Profes-
sor Swire also appears to imply agreement with Professors Macey and
Miller's assertion that at the present time it is difficult for institutions
pursuing "niche" strategies (such as wholesale banking) to obtain high
CRA ratings.
41
The application of basic economic analysis also points to various
potential interrelationships in this area. Agency theory, for example,
would hypothesize that managers of a business would be less con-
cerned about "sacrificing profits" to CRA activities (and perhaps
more concerned about good public relations) than owners.42 Conse-
quently, one might expect publicly traded depository institutions with
widely diffused ownership to have higher CRA ratings than nonpub-
licly traded institutions, which are often family-dominated. Also,
since the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of
195643 is the principal legal basis enabling banks to engage in inter-
state acquisition activity, one would probably expect institutions that
are part of such bank holding companies to have higher CRA ratings
than institutions not so organized (especially given the need for ac-
quiring institutions to have high CRA ratings). 44 These and other hy-
potheses are empirically tested below.
37. Swire, supra note 2, at 352 n.9.
38. Id.
39. A CRA protest is a protest by community groups to a bank's merger or acquisi-
tion based on CRA grounds. See, e.g., Texas Commerce Sets Asset Sale to Meet Antitrust
Objections, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1993, at A3 (stating that the Comptroller of the Currency
had delayed approval of a bank's proposed acquisition in order to investigate CRA com-
plaints it had received).
40. Swire, supra note 2, at 352 n.9.
41. See id. at 354.
42. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR:
MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM (1964) (arguing that in certain cir-
cumstances the disassociation of owners from managers results in profits becoming secon-
dary in preference); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
43. Pub. L. No. 511, § 3(d), 70 Stat. 133, 135 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 1842(d) (1988)).
44. For a discussion of bank holding company interstate acquisition versus interstate
branching, see Leonard Bierman & Donald R. Fraser, The Canada-United States Free
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
B. Methodological Overview and Preliminary Hypotheses
We explored the relationship between CRA ratings and the char-
acteristics of individual banks with the use of a database developed
from the FDIC data tapes on the financial condition of individual
commercial banks. These tapes provide balance sheet and income
statement data on every insured commercial bank in the United States
for each quarterly reporting period. For ease of analysis, our study
uses balance sheet data as of the end of 1990 and income statement
data for the year 1990.
Numerous variables were constructed from this data for the over
4,000 commercial banks for which CRA rating data were available.
Among the variables constructed were:
(1) Total Loan Ratio, defined as the dollar amount of total loans
for the bank at year end divided by the dollar amount of total assets.
To the extent that the CRA encourages banks to make loans in their
community, it would be expected that banks with higher loan ratios
should have better CRA ratings.
(2) Residential Loan Ratio, defined as the dollar amount of total
loans secured by one- to four-family residences divided by total assets.
As with variable (1), banks with higher residential loan ratios should
have better CRA ratings. Given the recent focus on providing resi-
dential loans in a nondiscriminatory manner,45 this relationship should
be especially strong.
(3) Consumer Loan Ratio, defined as the dollar amount of loans
to individuals divided by total assets. As with the residential real es-
tate loans, high CRA ratings should be found in banks with a compar-
atively high amount of consumer loans.
(4) Multifamily Loan Ratio, defined as the dollar amount of
loans on income-producing residential property other than one- to
four-family residences divided by total assets. This was developed be-
cause other dimensions of the mix of loans may be important in influ-
encing the CRA rating. The a priori expectation for the relationship
between this variable and the CRA rating is not entirely clear. To the
extent that making more loans is perceived by the regulators as posi-
tive, then high CRA ratings should accompany high multifamily loan
ratios. This would be particularly true if some of these loans are for
Trade Agreement and U.S. Banking: Implications for Policy Reform, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 1,
24-29 (1988); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 Hoi=sRA L. REv. 1133, 1314-41
(1981).
45. See Laura E. Schotsky, Community Reinvestment Act, 12 ANN. REv. BANKING L.
70-76 (1993).
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low-income or other kinds of housing that would tend to be viewed
favorably under the CRA. However, some of these loans may be out-
of-territory, and some may also be wholesale rather than retail in na-
ture. These possibilities may cause regulators to perceive them as
harmful to the CRA effort, and thereby result in lower CRA ratings.
(5) Marketable Security Ratio, defined as the ratio of the dollar
amount of holdings of marketable-investment securities divided by to-
tal assets. As discussed above and developed by Professors Macey
and Miller,46 it is hypothesized that the larger a bank's marketable
security ratio, the worse will be its CRA rating.
(6) Other Bank Performance Ratios. Since there may be a rela-
tionship between the manner in which examiners assign a CRA rating
and the overall performance of a bank (i.e., because the CRA rating
and the regulatory "safety and soundness" rating47 may be corre-
lated), two performance measures were examined: (a) Net Interest In-
come Ratio, defined as the difference between interest revenue and
interest expense divided by the total assets; and (b) Loan Loss Provi-
sion Ratio, defined as the amount of the expense item "provision for
loan losses"' 48 divided by total assets. We hypothesize, as did Profes-
sors Macey and Miller, 49 that the lower-profitability banks should
have better CRA ratings, since these banks have adopted suboptimal
portfolios in order to conform to CRA requirements.
The following three important variables were developed in order
to focus on the CRA hypotheses previously discussed:
(7) Trading Status, defined as "1" if the bank issued publicly
traded stock and as "0" if it did not. The hypothesis, as discussed
above,50 is that, pursuant to agency theory, managers of publicly
traded banks are more likely to make portfolio adjustments that pro-
duce better CRA ratings. Those banks are more visible (and gener-
46. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 318; text accompanying note 25.
47. Every federally insured commercial bank is evaluated annually on the basis of its
safety and soundness, using a CAMEL rating system. Under this system, the institution is
assigned a rating of 1 (best) to 5 (worst) based upon its Capital, Asset quality, Manage-
ment, Earnings, and Liquidity. See MONA GARDNER & DIXIE MILLS, MANAGING FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTIONS ch. 2 (1992).
48. Provision for loan losses is a deduction from income representing a bank's peri-
odic allocation to its loan loss reserves for the balance sheet. It represents management's
estimate of future losses on loans currently being made. See TIMOTHY KOCH, BANK MAN-
AGEIVENT ch. 4 (1992).
49. Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 319-22.
50. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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ally larger) than banks that are not publicly traded, and shareholder
ownership is generally more widely diffused.51
(8) Holding Company Status, defined as "1" if the bank is part of
a multibank holding company and as "0" if it is not. As noted
above,52 banks that are part of a multibank holding company can
more easily acquire other banks pursuant to the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act, and thus are more likely to be part of organizations that
have engaged in or will engage in acquisitions. Since regulators take
CRA ratings into account in approving such acquisitions, it would be
expected that banks affiliated with multibank holding companies are
more likely to take action aimed at achieving high CRA ratings.
(9) Number of affiliates, measured as the number of banks that
are part of the banking organization. For banks not affiliated with a
holding company or for one-bank holding companies, this number is
"0." Like the previous variable, the number of affiliates can be seen
as a proxy for acquisition activity. It would be expected that those
banks that are part of large bank holding companies (measured in
terms of number of affiliates) would be most likely to take actions to
obtain good CRA ratings.
H. Empirical Results
A. Univariate Analysis
Table One53 presents the means for the variables gathered on the
banks in the study. For each variable the mean is provided for all
banks with high CRA ratings ("outstanding" or "satisfactory") taken
as a group, and separately for all banks with low CRA ratings ("needs
to improve" or "substantial noncompliance") taken as a group.54 In
51. For example, Citicorp, the nation's largest bank, has $217 billion in assets and
approximately 64,000 common shareholders. Telephone Interview with Peter Bryan, Cit-
icorp Investor Relations (Aug. 9, 1993).
52. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
53. All of the tables are found infra in the Appendix.
54. We have also computed, in Table Two, the means for banks at the extremes of the
CRA ratings distribution, i.e., banks with 1 (outstanding) ratings versus banks with 4 (sub-
stantial noncompliance) ratings. A comparison of these means provides evidence that is
generally consistent with that in Table One.
As in Table One, although it appears that banks rated "outstanding" do make more
loans than banks rated as being in "substantial noncompliance," the difference is not statis-
tically significant. Banks rated "outstanding" do, however, make statistically significant
larger amounts of single-family residential and multifamily residential loans than banks
with the lowest CRA ratings. Similar to the results in Table One, the highest-rated banks
had statistically significant lower net interest income than the lowest-rated banks, and the
lowest-rated banks had significantly higher provisions for loan loss reserves than the high-
March 1994]
addition, a "t" test for the statistical significance of differences is con-
ducted and those differences that are significant at the one percent
level or the five percent level are indicated by asterisks.55
An examination of the means of financial performance ratios as
shown in Table One suggests limited but important differences be-
tween banks with high and low CRA ratings. For example, while
banks with high CRA ratings appear to make more loans than banks
with low CRA ratings (a loan-asset ratio of 52.97% for high-rated
banks versus 51.47% for low-rated banks), the differences between
the two means is not statistically significant. The data also suggest the
loans high-rated banks make are not riskier than those made by banks
with lower CRA ratings. This is because banks with high CRA ratings
have, on average, provisions for loan losses that are less than those
with low CRA ratings.56 These data seem to cut against Professors
Macey and Miller's assertions that the CRA may force banks to make
risky (i.e., "bad") loans. 57
Table One also shows that banks with high CRA ratings have sta-
tistically significant lower net interest income than banks with low
CRA ratings. The lower net interest income earned by banks with
high CRA ratings may have the effect of removing significant
amounts of capital from bank lending capacity. More simply put,
money that is not earned is generally not available to be lent out to
other individuals. Thus, quite ironically, high bank CRA ratings may
in a sense work to harm communities in which these banks are located
because these banks have less funds available for lending in the com-
munity. Consequently, as Professors Macey and Miller point out in
their article, 58 and as Professor Macey has forcefully emphasized in a
est-rated banks. On average, the highest-rated banks were more than twice as large in
terms of total assets than the lower-rated banks, and over three times as likely to be pub-
licly traded than their lowest-ranked counterparts. Finally, while 39% of the highest-rated
banks were part of a bank holding company, less than 9% of the lowest-rated banks were
organized in this manner.
55. The "t" test indicates whether the samples come from the same population. If, for
example, the difference between the means is statistically significant at the 1% level, it
means that the chances are 99% that the samples come from two different populations. In
other words, the chances are 99% that the difference in ratios actually corresponds to a
difference in behavior. See Eric A. Hanushek & John E. Jackson, STATISTICAL METIODS
FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 122-24, 336-37, 363 (1977). Those values without an asterisk are
not statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level. This does not mean that these values are
statistically insignificant-it merely means that they are significant at a level of greater
than 5%.
56. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. See supra note 55.
57. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 319-22, 324.
58. Id. at 340-41.
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more recent "op-ed" article,59 the CRA's impact on local communities
is not necessarily a positive one.
In addition, given the apparent possible magnitude of lost earn-
ings, the lack of strong bank shareholder criticism regarding high de-
grees of CRA compliance seems puzzling. Our data suggest that
"agency theory" may offer a partial explanation. Banks with high
CRA ratings are almost twice as likely to be publicly traded as banks
with low CRA ratings. 60 Such publicly traded institutions generally
have widely diffused ownership, with lost profit opportunities being
spread amongst numerous, often geographically dispersed individu-
als.61 These dispersed owners may have difficulty closely monitoring
bank managers, 62 who may own relatively little equity in the bank,
63
and who may put a high value on achieving a positive reputation for
the bank (and perhaps derivatively for themselves). 64 One way for
bank managers to achieve such positive reputations is to earn high
bank CRA ratings, which is accomplished by investing in "CRA-posi-
tive" activities. 65
In contrast, nonpublicly traded banks are frequently smaller insti-
tutions (our data show that banks with lower CRA ratings are, on
59. Macey, supra note 16.
60. See infra Table One.
61. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 42; Eugene F. Fama & Michael C.
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (discussing the
survival of organizations in which agents responsible for important decisions do not bear a
substantial share of the wealth effects of their decisions).
62. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
(1985).
63. See VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY, June 11, 1993, at 2001-44 (outlining "in-
side ownership" at leading United States banks, many of which had less than two percent
of their shares owned by "insiders"). See generally Jennifer Reese, Buy Stock-or Die,
FORTUNE, Aug. 23, 1993, at 14 (stating that an increasing number of companies are forcing
their executives to buy stock in order to be sure the executives behave in the best interest
of the shareholders).
64. In the economics literature, this is referred to as the "expense preference" prob-
lem. The idea is that managers, to increase their own utility, may incur expenditures that
go beyond the optimal amount from a shareholder perspective. See Oliver E. Williamson,
Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 Am. ECON. REV. 1032 (1963) (the classic
article on the subject). For discussions of this phenomenon in the context of the banking
industry, see Franklin R. Edwards, Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries: Ex-
pense-Preference Behavior in Banking, 85 J. POL. ECON. 147 (1977); Timothy H. Hannan &
Ferdinand Mavinga, Expense Preference and Managerial Control. The Case of the Banking
Firm, 11 BELL J. ECON. 671 (1980); PETER S. ROSE, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN BANKING 42-44 (1987). See generally Loretta J. Mester, Owners Versus Manag-
ers: Who Controls the Bank?, FEDERAL RESERVE BD. PHILA. Bus. REV., May-June 1989,
at 13, 17 (discussing desires of bank managers to enhance their own "reputations" and to
engage in "upward window dressing" on behalf of the bank).
65. See generally Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 330-33.
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average, significantly smaller in terms of total assets than highly rated
banks66) with far more concentrated ownership; indeed, such banks
are frequently owned or controlled by a single family. 67 In such
banks, family members also serve in management roles and, in any
event, the owners of such banks can be expected to supervise closely
the activities of the bank's managers.68 Under such conditions, bank
owners probably will not permit bank managers to sacrifice earnings
beyond an optimal level in order to achieve enhanced reputational
effects (i.e., there are no "agency" problems). 69 In such a situation,
bank owners likely will see the relationship between overspending on
CRA activities and lost profits.70 Thus, it is not at all surprising that
nonpublicly traded banks have lower CRA ratings than publicly
traded banks.
Finally, our Table One data also preliminarily suggest the possi-
bility of considerable subjectivity in the assignment of CRA ratings by
regulatory authorities. Banks with high CRA ratings make only
slightly more loans than banks with low CRA ratings, and indeed
banks with low CRA ratings actually make more "consumer loans"
than banks with high ratings.71 Moreover, as noted above,72 banks
with high CRA ratings have, on average, a higher percentage of their
assets in marketable-investment securities than banks with low CRA
ratings.73 Thus, the data do not seem to indicate that the banks being
assigned high CRA ratings are uniformly those that actively put over-
whelming percentages of their assets to work helping consumers in
their communities.
These data thus seem to directly support Professor Swire's con-
tentions regarding the vagueness and subjectivity of the CRA evalua-
tion standards, and the consequent compliance burden these
standards place on depository institutions.74 Moreover, the data sup-
port the notion discussed above,75 that the CRA evaluation standards
as currently constructed afford regulatory authorities wide-ranging
66. See infra Table One.
67. See ROSE, supra note 64, at 40-41.
68. Id. at 43; see also Mester, supra note 64, at 16.
69. Again, in such situations, bank managers and owners may actually be one and the
same. See ROSE, supra note 64, at 43.
70. There will be not be any "expense preference" problem as there might be at larger
banks. Id.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
73. See infra Table One.
74. See Swire, supra note 2, at 349-56.
75. See supra notes 11-15, 28-30 and accompanying text.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
power and discretion.76 Indeed, in his July 15, 1993 testimony before
the United States Senate Banking Committee explaining the Clinton
Administration's proposals for reforming the CRA, Comptroller of
the Currency Eugene A. Ludwig stated that "the standards against
which examiners currently judge CRA performance are unclear and
subjective," 77 and they lack "credibility. ' 78 Thus, as will be discussed
below,79 one of the major thrusts of the Clinton Administration pro-
posals for the CRA is to have clearer and more quantifiable CRA
assessment standards in order to reduce "regulatory uncertainty." 80
B. Multivariate Analysis
While these comparisons suggest some differences between the
high-rated banks and the low-rated banks, such comparisons are lim-
ited in their usefulness because they do not consider the joint effects
of all the different variables simultaneously on the CRA ratings. It is
quite possible, for example, for a variable to be insignificant in its ef-
fect on the CRA within this framework, but to have a significant influ-
ence on the CRA once the effects of other factors are taken into
account. Controlling the effects for the potential influence of these
other factors requires a multivariate analysis,8' the results of which are
presented in Table Three.82 This analysis was performed with the use
76. See generally Cass & Gillette, supra note 30, at 320-25 (arguing that regulators are
often interested in maximizing their own sphere of influence and objectives).
77. Testimony of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, July 15, 1993 [hereinafter Ludwig
Testimony] (on file with Graduate School of Business, Texas A&M University).
78. Id.
79. See infra Part III.B.1.
80. Clinton Memorandum, supra note 31.
81. See generally HANuSHEK & JACKSON, supra note 55, at 109-40.
82. The logistic regression results of Tables Three and Four are presented as coeffi-
cients. The interpretation of these coefficients is explained best by example: In Table
Three, the coefficient of loans for Model 1 is 1.5319. This means that a 1% increase in the
loans to assets ratio increases the probability by 4.63 times, exp(1.5319), that the bank
would be classified as a complying bank. For a more detailed treatment of logistic regres-
sions and the interpretation of coefficients, see DAVID W. HOSMER, JR. & STANLEY
LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 38-81 (1989).
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of a Logit regression model.8 3 The results of the analysis are highly
consistent with those in the univariate analyses.
8 4
Table Three shows that, holding all other variables constant,
banks with high CRA ratings make significantly more overall loans
than banks with low CRA ratings. However, the data do not show
that the greater number of loans made by banks with high CRA rat-
ings was statistically significant in the two areas in which they might
intuitively be expected to be making more loans-consumer loans and
single-family residential loans. Moreover, the logistic regressions
clearly show that banks with low CRA ratings make significantly more
multifamily (e.g., apartment building) loans than do banks with high
CRA ratings. While some multifamily loans may be purely commer-
cial in nature, others may well be for low-income or other sorts of
housing that should be viewed positively for CRA rating purposes. In
addition, as in the univariate analysis,85 banks with high CRA ratings
have more of their assets in marketable-investment securities than
banks with low CRA ratings.8 6 This result is counterintuitive and
lends further support to the view that the CRA ratings assigned by
regulators may have a strong "subjective" element to them.
Another important finding in Table Three, again consistent with
the univariate analysis,8 7 is that there is an inverse relationship be-
tween bank net interest income, a measure of bank profitability, and
bank CRA rating. Banks with low CRA ratings have statistically sig-
nificant (at the one percent level) higher net interest income than
banks with high CRA ratings.88 Thus, complying with the CRA ap-
83. Unlike the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model (which requires that
the dependent variable theoretically can take any value from negative to positive infinity),
the Logit model can handle categorical or dichotomous dependent variables, and yet retain
the other desirable properties of the OLS model. In this analysis, the dependent variable
was defined as "1" if the CRA rating was a 1 (outstanding) or 2 (satisfactory) and "0" if it
was 3 (needs improvement) or 4 (unsatisfactory). Of the sample 4,365 banks, 3,981 were
classified as a "1" (with a CRA rating of 1 or 2) and 384 banks were classified as a "0"
(with a CRA rating of 3 or 4). A substantial number of logistic regressions were estimated
with different combinations of the variables. Four of these equations are presented in Ta-
ble Three. See generally id. at 187-203, 212-14.
84. As with the univariate analysis, an analysis was also conducted of the extremes of
the distribution, i.e., banks with the highest, or "outstanding," ratings as opposed to those
with the lowest, or "unsatisfactory," ratings. These logistic regression results are presented
in Table Four. The results of these analyses are consistent with those presented in Table
Three.
85. See infra Table One.
86. See infra Table Three.
87. See infra Table One.
88. See infra Table Three.
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pears to come at a cost to bank shareholders.8 9 Also consistent with
the univariate analysis,90 banks with high CRA ratings are not found
in the logistical regressions to take higher provisions for loan losses
than low-rated banks.91
Moreover, the logistical regressions conform with the univariate
analysis regarding publicly versus nonpublicly traded bank status.92
The data show a strongly significant relationship between high CRA
ratings and publicly traded status.93 The fact that banks with high
CRA ratings are significantly more likely to be publicly traded, and
that these same banks are significantly more likely to have lower net
interest income than their low-rated counterparts (holding all other
variables constant under logistical regressions) tends to lend further
credence to the "agency theory" hypothesis regarding banks and CRA
ratings advanced above.94 Finally, the logistical regressions found
high-rated banks to be significantly more likely to be part of a holding
company, and to have more numerous affiliates, than banks with low
CRA ratings.95 These results are fully consistent with the hypotheses
advanced by Professors Macey and Miller 96 and Professor Swire (in
the context of his "safe harbor" proposal) 97 that banks interested in
making acquisitions and otherwise expanding are more likely to have
higher CRA ratings.98
In sum, the logistical regressions are quite consistent with the
univariate analyses conducted. Both sets of results show the follow-
ing: First, high-rated banks make more overall loans than low-rated
banks, but there is no clear evidence that the loans they make directly
serve the community. Indeed, low-rated banks may in some instances
make more loans of this kind. Second, contrary to what might be gen-
eral intuition and contrary to the general assertions by Professors Ma-
89. It may also come at a cost to bank creditors and customers. See infra note 161 and
accompanying text.
90. See infra Table One.
91. See infra Table Three. One problem with examining loan loss provisions is that
banks are notorious for manipulating their loan loss provisions in order to "smooth" earn-
ings. See Christopher K. Ma, Loan Loss Reserves and Income Smoothing: The Experience
in the U.S. Banking Industry, 15 J. Bus. FiN. & Accr. 459, 487 (1988).
92. See infra Table Three.
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
95. See infra Table Three.
96. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 302-03.
97. See Swire, supra note 2, at 351-57.




cey and Miller in this regard, 99 banks with high CRA ratings have
more of their assets in marketable-investment securities than low-
rated banks. Third, banks with high CRA ratings have significantly
lower net interest income than banks with low CRA ratings. Fourth,
banks with high CRA ratings are significantly more likely, even hold-
ing all other variables including size constant, to be publicly traded
than low-rated banks. Finally, banks with high CRA ratings are more
likely to be oriented toward expansion and acquisition, at least to the
extent that holding company status and number of affiliates serve as
adequate proxies for these activities.
111. Policy Implications of Data
A. Overview
The most troubling problem in the administration of the CRA
pointed out by the empirical data is the apparent subjectivity involved
in the awarding of ratings. Banks with high CRA ratings do not ap-
pear to make more consumer loans or single-family residential loans
than banks with low CRA ratings. In fact, banks with high CRA rat-
ings appear to have greater amounts of assets in marketable-invest-
ment securities than banks with low CRA ratings. Given these
appearances, one must question the real bases on which CRA ratings
are being assigned. Any proposal for reform in this area must address
this issue.
Moreover, the empirical data supports Professors Macey and
Miller's contention that the CRA represents a direct and arguably dis-
criminatory "tax" on depository institutions that comply with its man-
dates. 100 Banks with favorable CRA ratings have significantly lower
net interest income than those with poor ratings,10 1 and show other
indicia of lower profitability.10 2 This finding raises troubling issues re-
garding enforcement of the statute, since organizations appear to have
incentives to "cheat" and get away with low compliance. 0 3 The em-
pirical evidence indicates that nonpublicly traded institutions are
99. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 317-18.
100. Id. at 312-13.
101. See infra Tables One and Three.
102. The univariate analysis of Table One also showed larger loan loss provisions for
high-rated banks, although the empirical results with respect to this issue have not been
consistent. Compare Table One with Tables Two & Three. Possible "manipulation" of
these provisions by bankers may be a factor. See Ma, supra note 91.
103. See generally infra notes 166-167 and accompanying text (stating that taxation by
regulation is difficult to enforce and that organizations often have incentive not to comply).
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among those most likely to cheat, 1°4 and managers of publicly traded
institutions are much more likely to comply with the CRA. 10 5 Of
course, the empirical results are entirely consistent with "agency the-
ory,"' 0 6 given that bank managers are not as directly affected by lost
profits as bank owners. However, given that publicly traded (and gen-
erally larger) banks tend to comply with the CRA, these institutions
seem to be at a competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis brokerage houses
like Merrill Lynch and other enterprises that increasingly offer bank-
ing services' 0 7 without being subject to the mandates of the CRA. 08
Thus, the CRA creates an "unlevel playing field" in the financial
services industry.10 9 Professor Macey has strongly criticized this
effect:
[B]anks are no longer an appropriate medium for transferring polit-
ical patronage.
Historically, the banking industry was a heavily regulated,
highly protected cartel. In exchange for banks' willingness to be
used in ways convenient to politicians, they earned the monopoly
profits enjoyed by cartels.
But the banking cartel has steadily broken down in recent
years, with the entry of unregulated firms. Mutual funds, insurance
companies, commercial finance companies, investment banks and
pension funds all compete directly with banks but do not have to
comply with inefficient regulations that restrict bank activities and
impede profitability.
For banks, these regulations include... above all, the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act. The CRA is the single most costly regula-
tion imposed on an industry being consumed by regulation. 110
Our empirical data support this assertion. The CRA places banks at a
competitive disadvantage versus other financial intermediaries. Thus,
any CRA reform effort must address this issue.
104. See infra Tables Three and Four.
105. This is supported by the empirical results even when confounding factors such as
bank size are held constant under logistic regression analyses. See infra Tables Three and
Four.
106. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
107. See Michael Siconolfi, Merrill Lynch, Pushing Into Many New Lines, Expands
Bank Services, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1993, at Al, A8.
108. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 312-13.
109. Id.
110. Macey, supra note 16.
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B. The Clinton Administration's CRA Proposals
(1) Overview
On July 15, 1993, President Clinton issued a memorandum re-
garding the CRA to the Comptroller of Currency, the Acting
Chairperson of the FDIC, the Chair of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and the Acting Director of the Office of
Thrift Supervision.11 In the memorandum, the President stated his
belief that "the CRA's full potential remains unrealized," and the stat-
ute's "implementation has focused too much on documentation and
process, and not enough on actual performance."' 12 The President
also pointed out that while CRA evaluation standards cannot be to-
tally objective, banks and thrifts are entitled to "clearer guidance as to
how the regulatory agencies will evaluate CRA performance.""13 To
this end, he instructed the four above-named regulators to work with
others in developing a new set of CRA regulations that will "reform
the CRA enforcement system by replacing paperwork and uncertainty
with greater performance, clarity, and objectivity."'1 14
On December 21, 1993, the aforementioned regulators released
for notice and comment proposed regulations for reform of the
CRA." 5 The thrust of these proposed regulations is to rate financial
institutions with respect to the CRA based on their "actual perform-
ance" in meeting community credit needs, as opposed to the rather
vague and subjective criteria currently being used." 6 To this end, the
proposal outlines a variety of new procedures.
First, under the proposed regulations, banks would be directly ex-
amined with respect to their lending practices and the makeup of their
loan portfolios." 7 More specifically, regulators would compare the
amount of loans'18 the bank or thrift was making to low and moderate
areas in its service area to the amount of loans it was making in its
overall service area.1 9 Institutions whose market share of low to
111. Clinton Memorandum, supra note 31.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Banking Committee on July 15, 1993 regard-
ing the President's CRA initiative, Comptroller of Currency Eugene Ludwig emphasized
the unclear and subjective nature of the current CRA evaluation process, and the need for
more performance-based standards. See Ludwig Testimony, supra note 77.
115. See 58 Fed. Reg. 67,466 (1993).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Different types of loans may be evaluated differently. Id. at 67,469.
119. Id. at 67.469-70.
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moderate income area loans exceeded its market share of other loans
would be strong candidates for an "outstanding" rating in this re-
gard. 120 Conversely, institutions whose market share of loans in low
to moderate income areas was less than its overall market share of
loans would be in danger of being assigned a rating of "substantial
noncompliance" or "needs to improve".' 2'
Similar performance-based evaluations are also to be conducted
with respect to financial institution "investment" and "service" activi-
ties. 22 For example, under the "service" component, regulators will,
among other things, examine the percentage of branches an institution
has that are "located in or readily accessible to low- and moderate-
income geographies in its service area."'13 Institutions with few
branches in such areas will likely receive "needs to improve" or sub-
stantial noncompliance" ratings on this component. 24
One major change in the proposed regulations is that of poten-
tially streamlined CRA evaluation procedures for financial institu-
tions with total assets under $250 million.' 5 The proposed regulations
appear to provide such institutions with a presumptive "satisfactory"
rating if they meet a relatively high loan-to-deposit ratio.' 26 The regu-
latory language seems to imply a sixty percent cutoff, i.e., if at least
sixty percent of their deposits are being loaned to customers, there
would be a presumptive "satisfactory" rating.' 27
The proposed regulations also give financial institutions the op-
tion, in lieu of the above-mentioned evaluatory schemes, to be evalu-
ated by regulators on the basis of a CRA strategic plan they have
developed.' 28 Such plans must state measurable CRA goals against
which "subsequent performance would be assessed."'1 29 Plans of this
120. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. 67,502 (test for Savings Associations).
121. See id.
122. See 58 Fed. Reg. 67,470-71.
123. Id. at 67,471.
124. Id.
125. This includes banks and thrifts that are independent institutions with assets of less
than $250 million or institutions with less than $250 million in assets that are members of
holding companies with total assets of less than this amount. See 58 Fed. Reg. 67,472
(1993).
126. Id.
127. See id.; see also Silver, Freedman & Taft, Federal Banking Agencies' Joint Pro-
posed Community Reinvestment Act Regulations 5 (Jan. 26, 1994) (on file with Graduate
School of Business, Texas A&M University).
128. See 58 Fed. Reg. 67,472 (1993).
129. Id.
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kind would be subject to public disclosure and comment before re-
ceiving even initial regulatory approval.
1 30
In developing the proposed CRA regulations, the Federal Re-
serve Board, the Comptroller of Currency, the FDIC, and the Office
of Thrift Supervision explicitly considered and rejected "safe harbor"
proposals of the kind suggested by Professor Swire.' 3a The regulators
noted that during public hearings on the regulations, groups "outside
the banking community" expressed strong opposition to any sort of
"safe harbor" approach based on CRA regulatory agency ratings. 132
Moreover, the proposed regulations do not address the applica-
tion of the CRA to "nonbank" financial institutions. 133 Under the
proposed regulations, mutual funds, brokerage houses, and other non-
bank financial intermediaries would continue to be exempt from the
CRA.
(2) Analysis
The Clinton Administration's proposed CRA regulations directly
address the problem of subjectivity in the current awarding of CRA
ratings, a problem made clear by our empirical data. 34 Moreover,
regulators in developing these regulations expressed sensitivity to the
fact that these new regulations, while more "objective in nature,
should not be formulaic.' 35 Nevertheless, the proposed market-share
lending ratios are indeed quite "formulaic" in nature, and have been
criticized by financial institution representatives in this regard. 136
The proposed streamlined CRA procedures for financial institu-
tions with under $250 million in total assets are interesting from a
number of perspectives. Both Professors Macey and Miller 37 and
Professor Swire 138 have posited that such smaller banks are likely to
have lower CRA ratings than larger banks, a hypothesis supported by
our empirical data. 139 In addition, such smaller banks frequently are
not publicly traded, 40 and our empirical data show that nonpublicly
130. Id.
131. See 58 Fed. Reg. 67,468 (1993).
132. See id.
133. See Regulators, Bankers Discuss Proposed CRA Rule Changes, SAY. & COMMU-
NITY BANKERS AM., WASH. PERSP., Feb. 7, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter Bankers' Reactions].
134. See infra Tables One and Three.
135. 58 Fed. Reg. 67,467 (1993).
136. See Bankers' Reactions, supra note 133.
137. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 315.
138. See Swire, supra note 2, at 351-52 n.12.
139. See infra Tables One & Three.
140. See ROSE, supra note 64, at 40-41.
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traded institutions tend to have lower CRA ratings than publicly
traded institutions.141 As developed above, this is consistent with
"agency theory," with smaller banks frequently having considerable
incentives to "cheat" with respect to CRA compliance. 142
The proposed regulations, while potentially "streamlined" in
terms of paperwork for small banks, also represent a much stricter
scheme of enforcement. In order to qualify for such streamlined CRA
review, small banks may have to meet a sixty percent loan-to-deposit
ratio. 43 However, during the past decade, many small banks failed
because of loan portfolio problems.144 This, along with a desire to
avoid problems with regulators concerned about potential future
FDIC insurance fund liabilities, 45 has made many small banks ex-
tremely conservative about making loans, in some cases maintaining
loan-to-deposit ratios of approximately thirty percent. 46 In some re-
gions of the country, the average loan-to-deposit ratio for all commer-
cial banks is presently less than sixty percent.147 Under the proposed
CRA regulations, though, such loan-to-deposit ratios might not qual-
ify banks for streamlined CRA review, and indeed would make them
somewhat suspect in the case of regular CRA review. Thus, small
bankers will likely find themselves under pressure to be conservative
in their lending to avoid possible loan losses and failure, and generous
in their lending in order to meet the sixty percent loan-to-deposit ratio
for simplified CRA examinations and favorable CRA ratings. Be-
cause this puts small banks in a catch-22 situation, reaction to the pro-
posed small bank CRA regulations has been strongly in favor of a
141. See infra Tables One and Three.
142. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
143. See 58 Fed. Reg. 67,472 (1993); Bankers' Reactions, supra note 133.
144. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failure: The
Politicization of a Social Problem, 45 STAN. L. REv. 289, 295-97 (1992) (discussing loan
portfolios as a cause of financial instability); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1153
(1988) (considering causes and consequences of bank failures, and proposals for proce-
dural reforms); Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 77 IowA L. RFv. 1083, 1102-05 (1992) (noting that smaller banks tend to
take more risks than larger banks).
145. Because of the plethora of bank and thrift failures in the 1980s, Congress recently
was forced to recapitalize the Bank Insurance Fund of the FDIC to the tune of $70 billion.
See Kenneth H. Bacon, Cracking Down; The New Banking Law Toughens Regulation,
Some Say Too Much, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1991, at Al.
146. See 1993 Annual Report of Texas State Bank, San Angelo, Texas 3 (on file with
Graduate School of Business, Texas A&M University).
147. See FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile, Third Quarter, 1993, at 4 (indicating new
loans- and losses-to-deposits ratio of 56.67% for all commercial banks in the southwest
region of the United States).
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more "flexible" test than that of a fixed sixty percent or other rela-
tively high ratio.
148
The loan portfolio issues likely to be faced by small bankers
under the proposed regulations are also ones larger financial institu-
tions are likely to confront, albeit in a more general way. Regulators
have told financial institutions that the regulators do not, under the
proposed CRA regulations, expect financial institutions "to sacrifice
safety and soundness standards to make any loan," and that the finan-
cial institutions should look at the proposed regulations in terms of
"new business opportunities" as opposed to "burden and cost."'1 49
Nevertheless, the whole thrust of the proposed regulations, as banking
executives have noted,150 is on meeting loan portfolio market share
ratios. Conservative lenders will likely find it even harder under the
new regulatory regime to achieve high CRA ratings. If they are inter-
ested in expanding, however, they will need high CRA ratings lest
regulators block such activities on CRA grounds, as they have been
doing with greater frequency.' 5' Thus, conservative institutions can
be expected to breach their normal, highly-conservative lending stan-
dards in order to fall into good graces with the CRA regulators (i.e.,
pay a CRA "tax" 52).
53
Moreover, large financial institutions are likely to continue to be
in direct competition for consumer funds with mutual funds and other
financial intermediaries that are not subject to the CRA. Over the
past decade, bank share of consumer deposit funds has shrunk from
eighty-four percent to fifty-four percent, while the share of such mon-
ies in mutual funds has risen from approximately sixteen percent to
148. See Bankers' Reactions, supra note 133.
149. See Letter from Jonathan L. Fiechter, Acting Director, Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion, Department of Treasury, to Chief Executive Officers of Savings Associations (Dec.
21, 1993), at 3 (on file with Graduate School of Business, Texas A&M University).
150. See Bankers' Reactions, supra note 133.
151. See Kenneth H. Bacon & Suzanne Alexander Ryan, Shawmut Decision Shows
Fed's Division Over Adequacy of Fair-Lending Records, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1993, at B2;
Shawmut National Sweetens Terms of Bid for New Dartmouth, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1993,
at B4.
152. For example, on February 8, 1994, Fleet Financial Group, facing government
probes into its lending practices and a possible CRA-based blockage of planned acquisi-
tion, made an $8.5 billion loan commitment pledge to low- and moderate-income borrow-
ers and to minority-owned businesses. See Suzanne Alexander Ryan, Fleet Financial Plans
Program on Lending, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1994, at A2; see also Suzanne Alexander Ryan &
John R. Wilke, Banking on Publicity, Mr. Marks Got Fleet to Lend Billions, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 11, 1994, at Al.
153. See generally Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 318-24 (discussing the "safety and
soundness" implications of the CRA).
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forty-six percent.154 The proposed CRA regulations, much to the ex-
pressed consternation of banking executives, 55 do not expand CRA
application to mutual funds or other nonbank financial intermediaries.
Reform of this kind seems worthy of careful consideration.
C. Taxation by Regulation
In a 1971 article entitled Taxation by Regulation, Professor (now
Judge) Richard A. Posner noted that "one of the functions of regula-
tions is to perform distributive and allocative chores usually associated
with the taxing or financial branch of government.' 56 Professor Pos-
ner argued that regulatory "taxation" has a number of positive and
negative attributes, and went on to develop a comprehensive frame-
work for analyzing regulation of this kind. 57 While Professors Macey
and Miller explicitly refer to the CRA as a "tax" on depository institu-
tions,' 58 neither they nor Professor Swire incorporate Professor Pos-
ner's analytical framework in their discussions of the CRA. 5 9
Nevertheless, Professor Posner's analytical model regarding taxation
by regulation appears to provide an unusually useful approach for ex-
amining and evaluating the CRA.
Posner, discussing the long history of regulations requiring pri-
vately owned firms to provide services "an unregulated competitive
market would not provide on the same scale," points out when "a ser-
vice is provided that does not pay its way in the market," someone
ultimately "must pay its way."'16 He argues that stockholders, credi-
tors, and customers of the firm will end up bearing this cost.' 6' He
states such regulation "alters normal business incentives"' 62 and it can
be viewed as an exertion (via regulatory agencies) of "state power
whose purpose, like that of other taxes," is to compel support of a
154. See Randall Smith, Deposits Loss Poses a Risk to U.S. Banks, WALL ST. J. Eu-
ROPE, July 1, 1993, at 20.
155. See Bankers' Reactions, supra note 133. Mutual funds, finance companies, and
other nonbank entities are obviously going to fight assiduously any such regulatory efforts.
See Karen Gullo, Finance Companies Bear Up to Ward Off CRA Regulations, Am.
BANKER, Dec. 22, 1993, at 4.
156. Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & M~mTr. Sci. 22,23
(1971).
157. IdL at 41-47.
158. Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 312-13.
159. Professors Macey and Miller do, however, develop the notion that the CRA rep-
resents regulatory taxation. Id. at 343.
160. Posner, supra note 156, at 23-24.
161. Id. Firm employees may also end up bearing these costs.
162. I& at 27.
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"service that the market would provide at a reduced level, or not at
all."'1 63 Moreover, Posner notes that the ability of regulatory agencies
to "control entry" into the field is an important adjunct to such regula-
tion. 64 Otherwise, firms not burdened with the costs of providing
these services will be able to enter the markets and compete on a
more effective basis.165
Posner also states that an "important characteristic of taxation by
regulation is difficulty (and expense) of enforcement."'1 66 He notes
the "tendency of regulated firms to cheat in providing unremunerative
services," and the likelihood that privately held companies will proba-
bly "resist providing unremunerative services more energetically"
than publicly owned ones. 167
Nevertheless, Posner debunks the criticism of taxation by regula-
tion, stating that while taxation by regulation "distorts the efficient
allocation of resources," and is "arbitrary" and "inequitable,"' 68 all
methods of taxation are distortive, and there is no reason to assume
that taxation of this kind is any more distortive, arbitrary, or inequita-
ble than any other form of taxation. 169 Indeed, he argues that there
may be numerous equitable and administrative advantages to taxation
by litigation.170 The one major problem with taxation of this kind,
however, is it has such "low visibility" that it frequently escapes public
scrutiny.171 Posner strongly recommends greater public visibility for
such tax subsidies and, when possible, "the amount and cost of the
subsidy, together with the identity of the recipients and of the payors,
be calculated and placed in the public record" so that important issues
of public policy may be brought into the open.
172
The CRA, as Professors Macey and Miller point out, is clearly a
regulatory "tax."' 173 Moreover, to the extent the regulatory authori-
ties have been unsuccessful in "controlling entry" into the banking
industry, Professors Macey and Miller also seem correct in asserting
the "tax" is discriminatory because firms like Merrill Lynch that di-
163. Id. at 29.
164. Id. at 29, 34-35.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 43.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 41.
169. Id. at 41-43.
170. Id. at 45-47.
171. Id. at 43-44.
172. Id. at 47.
173. Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 312-13.
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rectly compete with depository institutions are not covered by the
CRA and do not have to pay the "tax." 174
Our empirical data support Professor Posner's hypothesis that
there are considerable incentives for banks not to comply with the
CRA.175 CRA compliance may hurt not just a bank's shareholders or
creditors but also potentially its customers, who may have to pay
higher prices for, or perhaps be denied, certain services. 176 One presi-
dent of a small community bank recently questioned about the CRA
noted that banks are "market driven," and if they are not meeting the
needs of their communities, they will not be successful. 177 He added
that "the community ought to decide that, not the regulators."' 78
Nevertheless, to the extent there are overriding public policy con-
cerns in providing all segments of society with adequate access to
banking services and credit, the CRA's taxation by regulation may be
the most efficient way to achieve this end.' 79 The goal of this Article
has simply been to shed some light on the workings of a statute that
for so many years have been shrouded in secrecy, 180 and, as Professor
Posner would put it, to bring this issue more "into the open."' 8 '
Conclusion
On July 1, 1990, Congress for the first time required that deposi-
tory institution CRA ratings be made available to the public. Through
our collection and compilation of all the CRA ratings released to the
public during the first two years of this public disclosure,1' and the
correlation and analysis of these ratings against a wide range of depos-
itory institution financial data, we have hopefully been able to shed
some significant light on the actual operation of the CRA. Our data
174. See id.; see also Macey, supra note 16, at A10 (discussing the inefficiency of the
CRA regulatory scheme); Siconolfi, supra note 107, at Al, A8 (discussing Merrill Lynch's
expansion into traditional banking activities).
175. See infra Tables One and Three. Concerns in this regard are at the heart of the
Clinton Administration's CRA reform proposals.
176. See Posner, supra note 156, at 24.
177. See Joe Toland, Reinvestment Act Not Necessary for Local Banks, BRAzos VAL-
LEY Bus. J., July 1993, at 7 (interview with Allan Hanson, President, Commerce National
Bank, College Station, Texas).
178. Id.
179. See generally Posner, supra note 156, at 45-47 (stating the advantages of taxation
by regulation).
180. Until 1990, bank and thrift CRA ratings were not released to the public, and even
today the precise evaluative standards being used are unclear. See supra notes 18, 27-30,
74-80 and accompanying text.
181. Posner, supra note 156, at 47.
182. We gathered over 4,200 ratings from July 1, 1990 to March 31, 1992.
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reveal significant potential problems with the CRA-the assignment
of ratings is too subjective, financial institutions have incentive to
avoid compliance, and the failure to apply the CRA to nondepository
financial institutions has created unfair competition for banks that do
comply. Federal banking regulators, in their proposed new CRA reg-
ulations of December 21, 1993, have responded to some of these
problems, particularly in the subjectivity of enforcement. The pro-
posed new regulations do not, however, address the "unlevel playing
field" created by not applying the CRA to mutual funds and other
financial intermediaries. Indeed, the more objective standards and
stricter enforcement called for in the new regulations may further ex-
acerbate this problem. In addition, despite the concerns of the regula-
tors that the proposed new objective CRA standards not be
"formulaic," it seems difficult to see how they will be otherwise. The
result of all this is that depository institutions are going to be under
increasing pressure to make loans and provide services of a kind they
would not, using normal business judgment, make or provide. Such
CRA "taxation by regulation" does indeed appear to put the federal
government firmly in the credit allocation business.
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TABLE ONE
MEAN PERFORMANCE RATIOS FOR BANKS WITH HIGH CRA RATINGS
(RATINGS OF 1 OR 2) v. BANKS wrrH Low
CRA RATINGS (RATINGS OF 3 OR 4)
VARIABLE (1) (2) DIFFERENCE
CRA RATING OF CRA RAnNG OF
1 OR 2 3 OR 4 (1)-(2)
LOANS 52.97% 51.47% 1.50
SINGLE-FAMILY 13.63% 12.84% 0.79
RESIDENCE LOANS
CONSUMER LOANS 10.30% 10.32% -0.02
MULTIFAMILY 0.48% 0.72% -0.24
LOANS
MARKETABLE 29.74% 28.74% 1.00
SECURITIES
NET INTEREST 3.93% 4.10% -0.17*
INCOME
PROVISION FOR 0.40% 0.65% -0.25**
LOAN LOSSES
TOTAL ASSETS $676,560 $337,357 $339,203*
(thousands)
TRADED 8.20% 4.40% 3.80%
HOLDING 25.40% 13.80% 11.60%
COMPANY
NUMBER OF 1.89 1.04 0.85
AFFILIATES
* indicates statistical significance at the 5% level
** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level
March 1994]
TABLE TWO
MEAN PERFORMANCE RATIOS FOR BANKS
WITH "OUTSTANDING" ("1") CRA RATINGS
VS. BANKS WITH "SUBSTANTIAL NONCOMPLIANCE" ("4") CRA RATINGS
VARIABLE (1) (2) DIFFERENCE
CRA RATING OF CRA RATING OF
1 4 (1)-(2)
LOANS 56.22% 52.97% 3.35
SINGLE-FAMILY 14.25% 10.13% 4.12**
RESIDENCE LOANS
CONSUMER LOANS 11.79% 14.59% -2.80
MULTIFAMILY 0.59% 0.26% -0.33**
LOANS
MARKETABLE 22.59% 22.87% -0.28
SECURITIES
NET INTEREST 3.91% 4.57% -0.66**
INCOME
PROVISION FOR 0.33% 0.72% -0.39
LOAN LOSSES
TOTAL ASSETS $242,105 $119,058 $123,047**
(thousands)
TRADED 19.30% 5.70% 13.60%
HOLDING 39.00% 8.60% 30.40%
COMPANY
NUMBER OF 1.39 1.00 0.39
AFFILIATES
* indicates statistical significance at the 5% level
** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
TABLE THREE
LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR REGRESSION OF CRA RANKINGS
ON TOTAL ASSETS, LOAN RATIO, LOAN Mix RATIos,
MARKETABLEINVESTMENT SECURITIES RATIO, BANK PERFORMANCE RATIOS,
TRADING STATUS, MULTIBANK HOLDING COMPANY STATUS,
AND NUMBER OF AFFILIATES. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
TAKES A VALUE OF 1 IF THE CRA RATING IS 1 OR 2
AND A VALUE OF 0 IF THE CRA RATING IS 3 OR 4.
LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
INDEPENDENT MODEL MODEL MODEL MODEL
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4
INTERCEPT 2.0545** 2.0676** 2.1404** 0.2726
SINGLE-FAMILY 0.0598 0.0284 -0.0662 0.2331
RESIDENCE LOANS
LOANS 1.5319** 1.5581"* 1.6791** 2.6969**
CONSUMER LOANS 0.2252 0.2752 0.2261 0.8047




NET INTEREST -11.2462** -11.2441** -11.8189
INCOME
PROVISION FOR -40.6431 -40.0214 -41.0681**
LOAN LOSSES






* indicates statistical significance at the 5% level




LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR REGRESSION OF CRA RANKINGS
ON TOTAL ASSETS, LOAN RATIO, LOAN MIX RATIOS,
MARKETABLE/INVESTMENT SECURITIES RATIO, BANK PERFORMANCE RATIOS,
TRADING STATUS, MULTIBANK HOLDING COMPANY STATUS,
AND NUMBER OF AFFILIATES. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
TAKES A VALUE OF 1 IF THE CRA RATING IS 1
AND A VALUE OF 0 IF THE CRA RATING is 4.
LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
INDEPENDENT MODEL MODEL MODEL MODEL
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4
INTERCEPT 2.92** 2.96** 3.53** 0.29
SINGLE-FAMILY 3.88 3.87 3.89 5.26*
RESIDENCE LOANS
LOANS 1.88 1.91 1.53 2.29
CONSUMER LOANS 0.04 -0.02 0.49 -2.42




NET INTEREST -50.17* -50.96** -58.50**
INCOME
PROVISION FOR -90.46** -94.58** -82.13**
LOAN LOSSES






* indicates statistical significance at the 5% level
** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level
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